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Abstract This study investigated the relationship
between belief bias and fear of negative evaluation. Belief
bias refers to a bias in deductive reasoning that acts to
conﬁrm rather than falsify prior beliefs. Participants
(N = 52) with varying levels of fear of negative evaluation
completed a belief bias task by means of linear syllogisms,
with stimuli covering both social anxiety convictions and
factual neutral statements. A linear relationship was found
between fear of negative evaluation and belief bias for the
social anxiety conviction category. No differences in rea-
soning were found for the neutral syllogisms. These results
support the view that highly socially anxious individuals do
not have a reasoning abnormality, but do have difﬁculty
judging anxiogenic information as false and reassuring
convictions-contradicting information as true. Such belief
bias logically prevents dysfunctional cognitions from being
corrected, thereby sustaining phobic fear.
Keywords Belief bias   Social anxiety disorder  
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Introduction
Dysfunctional cognitions about rejection or shame are
central in social anxiety disorder. The fear stemming from
these convictions leads to a range of behaviours charac-
teristic of social anxiety disorder (Clark and Wells 1995;
Rapee and Heimberg 1997). Current cognitive models
emphasize the role of information processing biases such
as judgmental bias, attentional bias and interpretation bias
in maintaining socially anxious convictions (for reviews
see Bo ¨gels and Mansell 2004; Clark and McManus 2002;
Hirsch and Clark 2004). The major focus of current treat-
ment strategies (e.g., Clark and Wells 1995; CPA 2006;
Trimbos-instituut 2003) is to somehow challenge these
convictions in an attempt to replace dysfunctional and
oftentimes irrational beliefs by more rational ones. The
alleged crucial role of irrational beliefs in the persistence of
complaints points to the vital importance of individuals’
ability to draw adequate conclusions. The inability to draw
appropriate conclusions on the basis of available evidence
seems a particularly direct way to impede the adjustment of
irrational, anxiogenic beliefs. In cognitive psychology, the
relatively poor performance in drawing appropriate con-
clusions when reasoning with materials that are
counterintuitive (i.e., have a mismatch between the
believability and the logical validity) is known as the belief
bias effect. Despite its apparent importance, the ability to
evaluate (dysfunctional) beliefs in light of evidence has
received little attention in psychopathology research.
Belief bias refers to a bias in deductive reasoning that
acts to conﬁrm rather than falsify prior beliefs, which is
demonstrated in a tendency to endorse a priori believable
conclusions as valid and unbelievable conclusions as
invalid, regardless of their actual logical status (Evans
et al. 1993a). It is assumed to facilitate the maintenance of
a relatively stable belief system from which the world and
experiences can be interpreted without great effort, leaving
the attentional capacities for more urgent and complex
tasks. Therefore, in everyday life some degree of belief
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dangerous situations, it may well be adaptive to rely on
prior beliefs and act on plausible conclusions, rather than to
consider whether those conclusions meet the standards of
formal logic (e.g., Evans et al. 1993b). If, however, the
perceived threat is based on dysfunctional convictions (for
instance, ‘If I say something odd, people will ridicule me’),
belief bias may become counterproductive. In that case,
such a bias in deductive reasoning could impede the dis-
conﬁrmation of anxiogenic beliefs, which in turn may lead
to stable cognitions feeding the anxiety disorder (cf. de
Jong et al. 1997). Accordingly, belief bias may play a fairly
direct role in the maintenance of fearful preoccupations.
Belief bias can be measured using a linear syllogistic
reasoning task (e.g., Smeets and de Jong 2005). In per-
forming this task participants are asked to judge as quickly
as possible the logical validity of syllogisms consisting of
two statements, the premises, and a conclusion. Logical
validity refers to the necessity of a conclusion, assuming
that the premises are true. If it is true that ‘A is larger than
B’ and that ‘B is larger than C’, it follows that ‘A must be
larger than C’. Logical validity would be violated when
one concludes that ‘C is larger than A’ based on the given
premises. When judging the validity, participants are
instructed to ignore the believability of the conclusions.
Believability refers to the meaning of the syllogism’s
conclusion. An example of a generally believable conclu-
sion would be: ‘An elephant is bigger than a mouse’,
whereas ‘A mouse is bigger than an elephant’ represents an
example of a generally unbelievable conclusion. A valid
yet unbelievable linear syllogism would be as follows:
Premise 1 A mouse is bigger than a dog
Premise 2 A dog is bigger than an elephant
Conclusion A mouse is bigger than an elephant
Thus, participants have to judge whether a syllogism is
logically valid, while ignoring its meaning. People are
typically faster in reaching a decision about the validity of
a syllogism when there is a match than when there is a
mismatch between the validity and believability of the
conclusion.
Although it seems plausible to apply the belief bias
theory to dysfunctional convictions, there is a clear dis-
tinction with past research: Past studies have focussed on
universal truths and common beliefs for which confronta-
tion with disconﬁrming evidence is unlikely, whereas the
current study focusses on the potential relevance of belief
bias for dysfunctional convictions for which disconﬁrming
evidence is oftentimes available.
In a ﬁrst attempt to explore this relationship, de Jong
et al. (1997) tested spider phobic participants and non-
phobic controls for belief bias when reasoning with spider
phobia relevant materials. They failed to ﬁnd a convincing
difference between the phobic and the non-phobic group.
This might well have been due to methodological prob-
lems. Most important, spider phobia relevant beliefs (e.g.,
as indexed by the Spider Phobia Questionnaire by Arntz
et al. 1993) are hard to translate into linear syllogisms,
which are based on comparison (e.g., A spider is creepier
than a ﬁsh, a ﬁsh is creepier than a pigeon, hence a spider is
creepier than a pigeon). The necessary inclusion of a
comparison category decreases the resemblance between
the syllogisms’ conclusions and the dysfunctional beliefs,
thereby probably decreasing the sensitivity of the task. In
addition, it is doubtful whether spider phobia is the optimal
candidate for testing this hypothesis. Although there is
evidence that spider phobic individuals do report high
believability ratings for irrational spider related beliefs
(e.g., ‘the spider will kill me’; Arntz et al. 1993; Thorpe
and Salkovskis 1995), it is still a matter of dispute whether
dysfunctional beliefs indeed play a crucial role in the
aetiology and maintenance of the phobic complaints. Some
authors described spider phobia as a prototypical ‘‘non-
cognitive’’ (evolutionary prepared) fear (e.g., Seligman
1971). Accordingly, spider fearful individuals ﬁnd it
extremely difﬁcult to articulate what they actually fear
(e.g., Davey 1992).
Therefore, the present study focussed on social anxiety
(rather than spider phobia) to test further the potential role
of belief bias in anxiety disorders. Dysfunctional beliefs are
generally assumed to be central to social anxiety disorder
(e.g., Clark and Wells 1995), and a striking feature of these
beliefs is their persistence in the face of incompatible data.
That is, because socially anxious individuals cannot so
easily avoid the situations they strongly fear (as spider
phobic individuals can), most socially anxious individuals
will have been involved in many social situations that
contradicted their fearful convictions (e.g., situations in
which they are not ridiculed for saying something odd).
Moreover, social anxiety beliefs often imply social com-
parison, making social anxiety convictions more suitable
for translation into linear syllogisms (e.g., ‘I am not like-
able’ translates into ‘I am less likeable than others’ or into
a linear syllogism such as ‘I am less likeable than Jane and
Jane is less likeable than John’). The main aim of the
present study was thus to test the hypothesis that socially
anxious individuals are characterized by belief bias when
reasoning about social anxiety themes. Therefore, a group
of individuals varying in their level of fear of negative
evaluation (one of the central cognitive concepts within
social anxiety, e.g., Clark and Wells 1995) was presented
with a series of linear syllogisms concerning themes rele-
vant to social anxiety.
If enhanced belief bias is only evident for dysfunctional
convictions, this would be consistent with the idea that the
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reasoning abnormality, but may represent a normal tenacity
of important and strongly held beliefs (cf. Garety and
Hemsley 1997). Yet, research in the context of spider
phobia (de Jong et al. 1997) provided preliminary evidence
to suggest that psychopathology patients show a generally
enhanced belief bias (i.e., not restricted to the domain of
the psychopathological concerns). This raises the possi-
bility that this reasoning bias reﬂects a trait-like
information processing bias that acts as a diathesis in the
development of psychopathological disorders in general
(cf. Arntz et al. 1995). As a subsidiary issue it was there-
fore tested whether socially anxious individuals are (also)
characterized by enhanced belief bias for factual informa-
tion that is irrelevant for their social anxiety concerns.
To summarize, content interferes with logical reasoning
when reasoning with highly believable materials. As
socially anxious people hold strong social anxiety convic-
tions, one can expect to ﬁnd a belief bias effect concerning
social anxiety related materials for the high social anxiety
group and not for the low social anxiety group. In addition
to this content-speciﬁcity hypothesis, it is explored, based
on the earlier ﬁnding by de Jong et al. (1997), whether high
socially anxious people have a general tendency to apply
belief bias more often compared to low anxious people.
Therefore, we also tested whether socially anxious indi-
viduals will show a relatively strong belief bias when
reasoning with neutral, generally believable, materials.
Method
Participants
As part of their course requirement, ﬁrst-year psychology
students (N = 339) participated in a mass-screening during
the start of the ﬁrst semester. The majority of these students
(N = 234) gave permission to contact them for further
research.
1 On the basis of their scores on the brief Fear of
Negative Evaluation scale (BFNE, Leary 1983; for more
details see below) we pre-selected extreme groups. High
and low scoring students on the scale were approached for
the current study, six months after the mass screening.
Participants from the extreme ends of the distribution of the
BFNE scores were contacted until 30 students
2 were
willing to participate for each group (to include 30 willing
participants per group, 25% of the lowest scoring partici-
pants and 20% of the highest scoring participants were
contacted; BFNE scores ranged from 1 to 15 and 30 to 48,
respectively). Of these 30 participants, 26 of each group
showed up at the lab. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 15 men
(7 high anxiety and 8 low anxiety) and 37 women (19 high
anxiety and 18 low anxiety), with a mean age of 20
(SD = 1.65). Participants received course credits, or a
small ﬁnancial reward if they had already fulﬁlled course
requirements.
Participants again completed the BFNE as part of the
experiment. Unexpectedly, participants’ BFNE scores
during the actual experiment no longer showed a bi-modal
distribution. In fact, participants’ BFNE scores were now
distributed over almost the entire range of the BFNE
(range = 1–42, M = 22.65, SD = 11.37, P25 = 13.5,
P50 = 22.5, P75 = 33.75). The average BFNE scores of
untreated Dutch social anxiety disorder patients in the
Netherlands is around 34
3 (e.g., Voncken et al. 2003,
M = 33.9; Voncken et al. 2007, M = 28.7–38.0; Bo ¨gels
et al. 2006, M = 36.67). Looking at the percentiles of our
distribution, we can thus conclude that about 25% of the
BFNE scores that were assessed on the day of the experi-
ment were as high as or higher than the average social
anxiety disordered patient score. A paired sample t-test
revealed no changes in average BFNE score over time
(Mpreselection = 23.87, Mexperiment = 22.65, t(51) = 1.01,
p = .317).
Materials and Apparatus
Syllogistic Reasoning Task
Linear syllogisms in the form ‘a[b, b[c, therefore
a[c’ were constructed for the social anxiety convictions
domain. In an attempt to cover the most relevant convic-
tions eight topics were selected based on the Social Phobia
Beliefs Questionnaire (SPBQ,
4 e.g., I am more vulnerable
than others in social situations, Everybody watches me in
social situations, and I am less skilled than others in social
situations; List based on description of cognitions in social
anxiety by Beck et al. 1985). To rule out the possible
inﬂuence of idiosyncratic associations between particular
names and particular characteristics, the terms ‘person 1’
and ‘person A’ were used rather than concrete names as the
neutral reference persons in the syllogisms. Each topic was
presented in two perspectives: a public self-referent (e.g.,
1 These students did not differ in their BFNE-scores (yes-permission
BFNE = 22.6, no-permission BFNE = 22.0, t (337) = .63, P[.05).
2 Power-analysis indicated that with an expected large effect and
with 80% power and a = .05, n per group should be at least 25.
Anticipating potential technical problems during data acquisition and/
or participants not showing up, it was decided that 30 subjects should
be selected per group.
3 The Dutch BFNE uses a 0–4 scale, whereas some English versions
use a 1–5 scale. This explains the seemingly large differences in
Dutch and English-speaking patients’ BFNE scores.
4 The psychometric properties of the SPBQ are reported in an
unpublished master-thesis (Bezemer 1995).
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self-referent (e.g., I am less interesting than person 1)
perspective. This was done because the literature seems
unclear in whether social anxiety disorder concerns nega-
tive public or private self-referent convictions, or both
(e.g., Mansell and Clark 1999; Hofmann and Scepkowski
2006), and to ensure targeting the convictions that are most
relevant for social anxiety patients. See Appendix 1 for a
list of all social anxiety congruent convictions syllogisms
that were used in this study.
To test reasoning with factual (neutral) materials, eight
complaint-irrelevant, neutral syllogisms were included that
refer to common knowledge (e.g., A leopard is faster than
a human being. A human being is faster than a snail.
Therefore, a leopard is faster than a snail). See Appendix 2
for a list of all neutral syllogisms that were used.
Traditionally, the belief bias effect has been deﬁned as
the interaction between logical validity and believability,
with higher latencies and more errors for syllogisms that are
valid yet unbelievable and syllogisms that are invalid yet
believable (i.e., when there is a mismatch between logical
validity and believability) (Evans et al. 1993a, b). In the
present study, the term ‘believability’ is not used. The term
‘reality value’, with the dimensions ‘true’ and ‘untrue’, is
used to refer to the content of the neutral common knowl-
edge syllogisms and the term ‘social anxiety convictions’
(SA convictions), with the dimensions ‘SA congruent’ and
‘SA non-congruent’, to refer to the content of the social
anxiety themes.
5 Thus for the neutral themes, a belief bias
effect is manifested in the interaction between logical
validity and reality value, with higher latencies and more
errors when there is a mismatch between the reality value of
a conclusion and its logical validity, whereas reasoning
performance is enhanced (faster responding, less errors)
when there is a match between a conclusion’s logical
validity and reality value. The domain-speciﬁc belief bias is
manifested in the interaction between the congruency of the
individual’s social-anxiety-relevant convictions (social
anxiety congruent or non-congruent) and logical validity of
the syllogisms. Thus, for socially anxious individuals, rel-
ative poor performance (i.e., slow and more mistakes) is
expected when solving SA congruent-invalid and SA non-
congruent-valid syllogisms, but relatively good perfor-
mance (fast and few errors) when answering SA congruent-
valid and SA non-congruent-invalid syllogisms.
Each topic from the SA convictions category was pre-
sented in a SA congruent-valid, a SA non-congruent-
invalid, a SA congruent-invalid, and a SA non-congruent-
valid manner. Each topic from the neutral common
knowledge category was presented in a true-valid, an
untrue-invalid, a true-invalid, and an untrue-valid manner;
see Tables 1 and 2 for an example of each combination.
For all syllogisms the two premises were presented in two
orders (a[b, b[c and conclusion a[c against b[c,
a[b and conclusion a[c) to counter possible reading
strategies that could undermine the task’s sensitivity as a
measure of reasoning bias (cf. Smeets and de Jong 2005).
For the social anxiety relevant part 8 topics 9 2 per-
spectives 9 4 types 9 2 premise orders = 128 syllogisms
were used. For the neutral common knowledge themes 8
topics 9 4 types 9 2 premise orders = 64 neutral syllo-
gisms were used. Both categories of syllogisms were
presented intermixed in four blocks of trials, separated by a
ﬁxed 30-s break. Each block started with three ﬁller syl-
logisms used in a previous experiment to ensure
participants were focused on the task when answering the
experimental syllogisms. The outcome measures were
reaction time (RT) and number of errors.
Stimuli were divided over the four blocks and were
presented in a ﬁxed random order with the following
restrictions—topic and perspective should differ between
all consecutive stimulus presentations, a particular syllo-
gism type (e.g., true-invalid) could not occur more than
twice in a row and premise order should differ at every
fourth stimulus presentation at least. To ensure that all
blocks resembled each other, all syllogism topics were
presented equally frequently in each block, and premise
order and syllogism type were balanced as a function of
category and perspective within blocks. Hence, each topic
of the neutral common knowledge category was presented
twice and each social anxiety relevant topic was presented
twice for each perspective, public or private self-referent,
per block. With these restrictions, four similar ﬁxed ran-
dom stimulus lists were created.
To counter possible carry-over effects between blocks,
multiple stimulus list combinations were created. First,
reversed (z–a) duplicates were made out of the four stim-
ulus lists described above. After that, the resulting eight
different lists were combined into six different list com-
binations. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the list combinations.
Belief Check
To conﬁrm that the social anxiety syllogisms were indeed
congruent with social anxiety concerns, participants were
asked to indicate how believable they rated the SA con-
gruent and the SA non-congruent conclusions used in the
syllogistics reasoning task. The conclusions were presented
as statements on a computer screen, four at a time.
5 Contrary to common practice, the term ‘believability’ is not used,
because in our study, there is an important distinction between the
neutral and the SA convictions themes: the neutral themes relate to
factual information while the SA convictions relate to beliefs people
have. For these latter themes, the factual status of the beliefs cannot
be known.
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Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). These VAS’s were 17 cm in
length with ‘unbelievable’ displayed left of the VAS, and
‘believable’ right of the VAS. The VAS’s were presented
below each statement. Participants had to click on a posi-
tion on the line with the mouse for their answer, with which
a vertical dash appeared on the line. Participants could
change the position of the dash if they liked. After having
completed all four VAS’s per screen, participants clicked a
‘continue’ button for the next screen. The ﬁnal VAS
answers were rescaled into a 0–100 range. Final believ-
ability ratings per statement thus ranged from 0 to100.
Fear of Negative Evaluation
The 12-item brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (Leary
1983) was used to measure core concerns of social anxiety.
Items of the BFNE (e.g., I am often afraid that people will
notice my shortcomings) are rated on a 5-point scale (0–4)
indicating the self-reported applicability of the items. The
scores range between 0 and 48, with 48 indicating extreme
fear of negative evaluation. The BFNE discriminates
between social anxiety disorder and panic disorder and also
has good concurrent validity (Collins et al. 2005). Internal
consistency in the present sample was high at mass-
screening (Cronbach’s alpha = .97, n = 52), as well as
during the experiment (Cronbach’s alpha = .94, n = 52).
Procedure
Experimenters were blind to the participants’ fear of neg-
ative evaluation pre-test scores. The participants were
tested in small groups (one to six participants). Participants
were asked to start the computer programme. They were
instructed to judge the validity of the syllogisms as quickly
as possible by pressing a red ‘NO’ key on the left side of
the keyboard or a green ‘YES’ key on the right. Partici-
pants were given four practice items with feedback on the
correctness of their answers. Further explanation of the
validity of the conclusion was given for the ﬁrst and second
practice items. The instructions were repeated at the start of
each block. Each stimulus was preceded by a blank screen
(500 ms) and a screen reading ‘pay attention!’ (1,500 ms).
Each stimulus disappeared as soon as a response was given,
with a maximum of 20 s. If no response was given within
this interval, it was treated as an incorrect response. After
participants had completed the syllogistic reasoning task,
they completed the belief check, after which they ﬁlled out
a hardcopy version of the BFNE and were debriefed.
Data Analysis
The outcome measures of the syllogistic reasoning task
were computed by averaging the median RTs of the four
blocks. For errors, the sum of errors over the blocks was
computed. As reaction times have a ﬁxed cut-off point (0 s
or close to 0 s, depending upon the task that needs to be
performed) possible skewness of the RT data was antici-
pated. It was therefore planned to use square rooted RT as
outcome measure.
Although the study was initially designed to compare a
high and a low anxious group, the participants showed a
continuous rather than dichotomous distribution of BFNE
scores (see participants section). To retain optimal power,
the full range of scores was used, treating BFNE as a
continuous measure of social anxiety. As such, our
Table 1 Examples of social anxiety convictions syllogism, varying in logical validity and SA congruency
Logical status ‘SA congruent’ ‘SA non-congruent’
Valid Others ﬁnd me less capable than person A Others ﬁnd person 1 less capable than person A
Others ﬁnd person A less capable than person 1 Others ﬁnd person A less capable than me
Others ﬁnd me less capable than person 1 Others ﬁnd person 1 less capable than me
Invalid Others ﬁnd person 1 less capable than person A Others ﬁnd me less capable than person A
Others ﬁnd person A less capable than me Others ﬁnd person A less capable than person 1
Others ﬁnd me less capable than person 1 Others ﬁnd person 1 less capable than me
Table 2 Examples of neutral
syllogism, varying in reality
value and logical validity
Logical status True Untrue
Valid An elephant is bigger than a dog A mouse is bigger than a dog
A dog is bigger than a mouse A dog is bigger than an elephant
An elephant is bigger than a mouse A mouse is bigger than an elephant
Invalid A mouse is bigger than a dog An elephant is bigger than a dog
A dog is bigger than an elephant A dog is bigger than a mouse
An elephant is bigger than a mouse A mouse is bigger than an elephant
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More belief bias for social anxiety congruent materials
with increasing BFNE scores is expected. In addition, it
was explored whether belief bias for neutral common
knowledge materials increases with BFNE scores.
Accordingly, the RT/error data were subjected to a multi-
level regression analysis using the MLwiN programme (see
http://www.cmm.bristol.ac.uk/MLwiN/index.shtml; Ras-
bash et al. 2004).
All multilevel models were ﬁtted with ‘measures per
subject’ as level one, and ‘subject’ as level two. The
within-subject variables were dummy coded: SAcongru-
ency 0 (SA non-congruent) and 1 (SA congruent); reality 0
(untrue) and 1 (true); validity 0 (invalid) and 1 (valid).
BFNE * within-subject effects were also computed. For
each category, two multilevel models were compared by
means of a v
2 likelihood ratio test; the basic model which
appreciates the experimental within-subject structure but
ignores the potential inﬂuence of BFNE (see Table 3,
Eqs. 1 and 3 for the basic model of the social anxiety
convictions and the neutral common knowledge category,
respectively), and the hypothesized BFNE-interaction
model including both the experimental within-subject
structure and its potential interaction with the BFNE (see
Table 3, Eqs. 2 and 4 for the BFNE-interaction model of
the social anxiety convictions and the neutral common
knowledge category, respectively). For each category, it
was evaluated which model ﬁtted the data best. Within the
best ﬁtting model, the predictors were examined by means
of t-tests. For the social anxiety conviction syllogisms, our
hypothesis refers to a better ﬁt of the BFNE-interaction
model, and within this model, a signiﬁcant contribution of
the BFNE * SAcongruency * validity interaction to the
prediction. For the neutral common knowledge syllogisms
it was explored whether the ﬁt improves when including
the BFNE-interaction and, if so, whether the
BFNE * reality * validity interaction signiﬁcantly con-
tributes to the prediction. For all tests, a critical value of
a = .05 was adopted, one-sided for v
2-tests and t-tests.
Results
Belief Check
The believability scores of the social anxiety themes were
calculated by subtracting the believability rating of the
congruent conclusion from the non-congruent conclusion
per theme, so that negative scores reﬂected negative, social
anxiety congruent, views. For each theme, the believability
scores for the public self-referent and the private self-ref-
erent perspective were averaged, resulting in eight
believability scores. Also, an overall believability score
was calculated by averaging all believability scores.
Cronbach’s alpha was computed to determine the inter-
nal consistency of the eight themes, which proved to be
good (a = .86). Supporting the validity of the present
stimulus materials, the overall believability score correlated
signiﬁcantly with the BFNE scores (r =- .39, p = .004).
Syllogistic Reasoning Task
As expected, the RT data showed both signiﬁcant skewness
and kurtosis for some cells of the design. Normality was
improved by square-root transformation of the RT data, but
there were still some mild violations of kurtosis and
skewness (the highest kurtosis was reduced from zkurto-
sis = 7.6 to zkurtosis = 4.9, and the highest skewness from
zskewness = 5.6 to zskewness = 3.5). Details about the dis-
tributions can be obtained from the ﬁrst author on request.
Table 3 The basic model and the BFNE-interaction model for the common knowledge and the convictions domain used in the multilevel
analyses
Basic model BFNE-interaction model
Social anxiety
convictions
category
Square-root Reaction time ms ðÞ ij
¼ b0ijconstant þ b1SAcongruencyij
þ b2validityij
þ b3SAcongruency   validityij
þ u0j þ eij
(1) Square-root Reaction time ms ðÞ ij
¼ b0ijconstant þ b1SAcongruencyij þ b2validityij
þ b3SAcongruency   validityij þ b4BFNEj
þ b5BFNE   SAcongruencyij þ b6BFNE   validityij
þ b7BFNE   SAcongruence   validityij þ u0j þ eij
(2)
Neutral common
knowledge
category
Square-root Reaction time ms ðÞ ij
¼ b0ijconstant þ b1realityij
þ b2validityij þ b3reality   validityij
þ u0j þ eij
(3) Square-root Reaction time ms ðÞ ij
¼ b0ijconstant þ b1realityij þ b2validityij
þ b3reality   validityij þ b4BFNEj
þ b5BFNE   realityij þ b6BFNE   validityij
þ b7BFNE   reality   validityij þ u0j þ eij
(4)
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to statistical analysis (cf. de Jong et al. 1997). Hence sta-
tistical analysis was restricted to the RT data.
Social Anxiety Convictions Syllogisms
The BFNE-interaction model produced a signiﬁcantly
better ﬁt over the basic model: v
2 difference (4) = 10.029,
p = .040. The BFNE-interaction model best represents the
data and looks as follows:
Square-rootReaction time ms ðÞ ij
¼88:190 3:297 ðÞ ijconstant
þ 1:675 1:826 ðÞ SAconcruencyij
þ 4:116 1:826 ðÞ validityij
þ3:257 2:583 ðÞ SAconcruency validityij
þ0:126 0:130 ðÞ BFNEj
þ0:121 0:072 ðÞ BFNE SAcongruencyij
þ0:183 0:072 ðÞ BFNE validityij
þ 0:247 0:102 ðÞ BFNE SAcongruency validityij
þu0j þeij: ð5Þ
Most importantly, the BFNE * SAcongruency * validity
interaction dummy contributes signiﬁcantly to the predic-
tion (t (200) =- 2.422, p = .008). The main effect of
BFNE is not signiﬁcant, but the BFNE * validity interac-
tion dummy and the BFNE * SAcongruency interaction
dummy are (t (200) = 2.542, p = .006 and t (200)
= 1.681, p = .047, respectively). Furthermore, the dummy
for validity is also signiﬁcant (t (200) =- 2.281,
p = .012), with SA non-congruent-valid syllogisms being
solved slightly faster than SA non-congruent-invalid syl-
logisms, while the SAcongruency * validity interaction
dummy and the SAcongruency dummy are not signiﬁcant.
To be able to interpret the direction of the BFNE-interac-
tion effects, the equation was solved for our lowest and
highest scoring participant (BFNE = 1 and BFNE = 42,
respectively). The resulting patterns can be seen in Fig. 1.
There is a clear belief bias effect for high scorers (faster
responses when there is a match between the conclusions’
congruency with social anxiety-relevant convictions and
the conclusions’ logical validity), and no belief bias effect
for low scorers.
6
Neutral Common Knowledge Syllogisms
The BFNE-interaction model did not produce a signiﬁ-
cantly better ﬁt over the basic model: v
2 difference
(4) = 3.774, p = .437. The basic model best represents the
data and looks as follows:
Square-root Reaction time ms ðÞ ij
¼ 73:750 1:474 ðÞ ijconstant þ 8:846 1:086 ðÞ realityij
þ 3:788 1:086 ðÞ validityij þ  14:154 1:536 ðÞ
  reality   validityij þ u0j þ eij: ð6Þ
Thereisasigniﬁcantreality * validityinteractiondummy
(t (204) =- 9.215, p\.001), and solving the equation
shows that this interaction-effect is indeed the hypothesized
belief bias effect, see Fig. 2. This interaction was not
Fig. 1 Square-rooted RTs (ms) on the four conditions of the social
anxiety convictions domain for the lowest (BFNE = 1) and the
highest (BFNE = 42) socially fearful participants, illustrating the
SAcongruency * validity * BFNE interaction. BFNE = 1,
valid; BFNE = 1, invalid; BFNE = 42, valid;
BFNE = 42, invalid
Fig. 2 Square-rooted mean median RTs (ms) on the four conditions
of the neutral syllogisms. valid; invalid
6 When taking the two perspectives (public and private self-referent)
apart, treating them as a third within-subject factor, multilevel
analysis shows no signiﬁcant BFNE * SAcongruency * valid-
ity * perspective interaction (t (192) = 0.240, p = .405), indicating
that the two perspectives show a similar pattern of belief bias
dependent on BFNE.
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supporting the idea that highly socially anxious participants
display an increased general belief bias. The dummy for
reality was signiﬁcant, t (204) = 8.145, p\.001. On trials
representing syllogisms that are invalid, true syllogisms
(mismatched syllogisms, true-invalid) took longer to be
solved than untrue syllogisms (matched syllogisms, untrue-
invalid). The dummy for validity was also signiﬁcant,
t(204) = 3.488,p\.001.Fortrialsrepresentingsyllogisms
that are untrue, valid syllogisms (mismatched syllogisms,
untrue-valid) take longer to solve than invalid syllogisms
(matched syllogisms, untrue-invalid).
Additional Analysis
During the debrieﬁng procedure, some participants indi-
cated that they found the syllogistic reasoning task was too
long. In light of future use of this task, the data were
therefore re-analyzed using only the ﬁrst half of the task
(given the counterbalanced presentation of syllogisms over
the blocks, this does not result in a different or unbalanced
design). The results were similar to those obtained using all
stimuli: the BFNE-interaction model was superior to the
basic model for the social anxiety convictions category (v
2
difference (4) = 10.914, p = .028), and the BFNE * SA-
congruency * validity interaction dummy in this model
proved signiﬁcant (parameter-estimate: -0.250, t (200)
=- 1.852, p = .033). The BFNE-interaction model was
not superior to the basic model for the neutral common
knowledge category (v
2 difference (4) = 13.427,
p = .009), and therefore there was no BFNE * real-
ity * validity interaction.
Discussion
This study investigated the relationship between belief bias
and social anxiety. Although the study was initially
designed to compare a high and low anxiety group, a shift
in design had to be made due to the change in BFNE scores
after preselection. Instead of making group comparisons, it
was tested whether belief bias increased with increasing
BFNE scores. Furthermore, the analyses were restricted to
the RT data, as the error rates and the dispersion were too
low to be analysed. The low error rates indicate that par-
ticipants conﬁrmed to the task and did not show response
biases. The main results can be summarized as follows.
First, for the social anxiety relevant materials, results
indicated that the higher participants’ fear of negative
evaluation, the stronger the belief bias effect. Second, for
the neutral common knowledge syllogisms, there was an
overall belief bias effect that was independent of partici-
pants’ fear of negative evaluation.
According to contemporary cognitive models of anxiety
disorders, persistent dysfunctional cognitions (such as ‘If I
make a mistake, people will make fun of me’) play a vital
role in the maintenance of complaints (e.g., Beck et al.
1985; Clark and Wells 1995; Rapee and Heimberg 1997).
One obvious explanation for the refractoriness of this type
of anxiogenic convictions is that socially anxious individ-
uals are actually evaluated less positively than non-anxious
individuals, for example because they behave less skilful in
social situations. In line with this, there are indications that
in some situations people suffering from social anxiety
may indeed perform less well than non-anxious controls
(e.g., Stopa and Clark 1993; Voncken and Bo ¨gels 2008).
This does not however imply that the convictions of social
anxiety patients are necessarily true, as these oftentimes
concern blunt negative appraisal or rejection by others.
Another mechanism that may play a fairly direct role in the
persistence of these anxiogenic convictions concerns indi-
viduals’ difﬁculty to correct their dysfunctional convictions
when confronted with disconﬁrming evidence. Correcting
erroneous convictions requires the ability to accurately
deduce the logical implications of empirical evidence for
certain convictions. For instance, not being made fun of
after having made a public mistake should lead to correc-
tion of the dysfunctional belief ‘If I make a mistake, people
will make fun of me’, since it proves that the cognition is
invalid. In support of the hypothesis that belief bias may be
involved in social anxiety, the results for the RT data
showed that individuals high in fear of negative evaluation
have relative difﬁculty in judging anxiogenic (i.e., social
anxiety congruent) information as false and reassuring non-
congruent information as true. Such a belief bias effect for
social anxiety convictions logically prevents dysfunctional
cognitions from being corrected, thereby sustaining phobic
fear.
It should be acknowledged that belief bias theory con-
cerns errors in reasoning. In the present study we used
linear syllogisms that are known to be relatively easy and
to produce little errors (Huttenlocher 1968). Indeed, in line
with previous research using this type of syllogisms (e.g.,
de Jong et al. 1997), participants in this study made only
few errors. This implies that the participants actually rea-
soned analytically when performing the task. In this study,
a belief bias effect for RTs was found in a single-task
situation where all resources could be employed to the task.
With all resources available, the participants needed more
time to answer the mismatched syllogisms, indicating that
it took more effort and/or resources to answer these syl-
logisms. It seems safe to assume that when reasoning takes
more effort in a lab, it will result in faulty reasoning when
sufﬁcient cognitive resources and/or the motivation to
reﬂect on the validity of their initial convictions are lack-
ing, which is likely to be the case in most real life situations
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Obviously, further research manipulating the availability of
cognitive resources is necessary to arrive at more ﬁnal
conclusions in this respect.
The absence of a relationship between belief bias for
neutral common knowledge and fear of negative evaluation
indicates that anxious individuals are not characterized by a
reasoning abnormality and that the belief bias for social
anxiety convictions that was found in the present study
reﬂects a normal tendency to reason in a belief biased
manner with respect to strongly held convictions.
7 This
belief bias for social anxiety convictions is merely prob-
lematic because it logically acts to maintain convictions
that are dysfunctional.
The ﬁnding of complaint-related belief bias for indi-
viduals who are fearful of negative evaluation is an
important ﬁrst step in determining whether belief bias may
indeed be involved in the maintenance of social anxiety
disorder. Meanwhile, it should be acknowledged that on
the basis of the present study it cannot be ruled out that this
belief bias for social anxiety convictions is a mere symp-
tom of social anxiety rather than a mechanism that
reciprocally strengthens the dysfunctional convictions.
While causality problems of the present type are hard to
solve, they are theoretically important. As a next step it
would be worthwhile investigating whether post-treatment
belief bias is predictive of relapse after successful treat-
ment (cf. de Jong et al. 1995). If not, causality seems
highly unlikely. A more direct and rigorous way to test the
causal properties of belief bias would be to speciﬁcally
reduce belief bias and to test whether this results in a
reduction of dysfunctional beliefs and symptoms of social
anxiety (cf. MacLeod et al. 2002). Perhaps most relevant to
the clinical context is the question whether enhanced belief
bias present after successful treatment of the social anxiety
disorder can predict relapse. If the complaints have dis-
appeared, but social anxiety related belief bias is still
present, this belief bias potentially indicates that the patient
still holds social anxiety related convictions. As such, the
belief bias task may serve as an implicit measure to detect
such (potentially unreported) remaining beliefs. Of course,
further research is required to actually test these notions.
It is a well-established fact that the belief bias theory
holds for common knowledge and commonly shared prej-
udices (e.g., Evans et al. 1993a). The current study
illustrates that belief bias effects can also be found for
irrational convictions for which disconﬁrming evidence is
available. The ﬁnding that correct information does not
necessarily result in disconﬁrmation of irrational convic-
tions emphasizes the difﬁculty for people to reason
following logical rules. This underscores the importance of
explicitly discussing the arguments for and against dys-
functional convictions in the context of behavioural
experiments as a way to help patients to detect the relevant
premises or arguments for their dysfunctional conclusion.
Limitations
Although the correlation between the believability check
and the BFNE was signiﬁcant and supports the validity of
the stimulus materials that were used, the modest strength
of the association suggests that there is also still room to
further improve the validity of the stimulus material and
thereby the sensitivity of the present belief bias task. It
should be acknowledged that global social anxiety themes
were used. The validity of the task may be enhanced by
adjusting the syllogisms to individuals’ core beliefs. In
addition, the construction of linear syllogisms required the
inclusion of abstract contrasts (e.g., I am less socially
skilled than person A and person A is less socially skilled
than person 1) which might have resulted in a suboptimal
reﬂection of the individual’s actual convictions. Future
research may need to search for different paradigms to
measure belief bias which allow for a better match of the
materials with the actual convictions.
There was a discrepancy between the BFNE scores
during the mass-screening and during the experiment
proper. This could raise some doubts concerning the reli-
ability and validity of our screening instrument. Yet, the
reliability scores of both test administrations were high.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that the changes in scores
reﬂect real changes in social anxiety rather than a statistical
artifact (cf. Dijk and de Jong, in press) or unreliability of
the BFNE. Ample new social experiences associated with
starting a new life as a student could potentially explain the
unexpected deviance in FNE scores between the mass-
screening and the actual experiment. These change in
BFNE scores interfered with our planned factorial
approach. Fortunately, the range and distribution of BFNE
scores during the actual experiment allowed us to test our
hypotheses while maintaining the continuity of our data,
resulting in a relatively powerful design.
Another point of attention lies in the use of the BFNE as
a measure of social anxiety. There have been some con-
cerns with the use of BFNE as a measure of social anxiety,
given that it only measures beliefs and not behaviours
(Wilson and Rapee 2005). On the other hand, Collins et al.
(2005) and Weeks et al. (2005) have found that the BFNE
is a valid measure for clinical social anxiety groups. In
addition, Stopa and Clark (2001) showed that for
7 Based on the current design, it cannot be ruled out that high socially
anxious people display a stronger belief bias for all sorts of
convictions (e.g., prejudices) than low anxious people. This would
however not alter the interpretation of the current ﬁndings.
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BFNE-scores produces ﬁndings that are essentially the
same as those found in studies using social anxiety disor-
dered patients and non-clinical controls. The results of the
current study can be potentially relevant to other patient
groups as well: Studies using different analogue or patient
groups such as eating disorders have found correlations
between the BFNE and self-reported eating disorder and
depressive complaints (e.g., Gilbert and Meyer 2003;
Hinrichsen et al. 2003). On the other hand, both eating
disorder and depression self-report questionnaires are
known to correlate with other measures of social anxiety
complaints as well (e.g., Gibb et al. 2005; Hinrichsen et al.
2004), and both disorders are found to have high comor-
bidity with social anxiety disorder (e.g., Kessler 1995;
Pallister and Waller 2008). Whether the results of the
current study can be generalized to disorders such as
depression and eating disorder remains to be seen.
The order of the BFNE and the syllogistic reasoning task
was not counterbalanced over participants. The BFNE was
always administered after completion of the reasoning task.
This was done to avoid potential priming effects of the
BFNE on the reasoning task (cf. Bosson et al. 2000),
however this procedure may have enhanced existing indi-
vidual differences in BFNE scores.
A ﬁnal remark concerns the generalisation of the current
ﬁndings. It remains to be seen whether similar ﬁndings will
be obtained in a more male/female balanced group, as well
as in less highly educated groups. In addition, the present
study relied on an analogue sample, and it remains there-
fore to be seen whether similar ﬁndings will be obtained in
treatment seeking individuals suffering from a clinically
diagnosed social anxiety disorder.
Conclusion
The present study supports the potential importance of
belief bias in the maintenance of social anxiety disorder.
Future studies are necessary to investigate whether the
present effects can be replicated with patients suffering
from social anxiety disorder or other forms of psychopa-
thology in which dysfunctional cognitions are assumed to
play a critical role, such as depression, and to test the
alleged causality of this bias in maintaining and developing
psychopathological complaints.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 Linear syllogisms;
social anxiety convictions
category
Note. The syllogisms were
varied in congruency and
validity. Only the congruent
with SA and valid syllogisms
are presented in the table
Syllogism content Conclusion
I\person A\person 1 (less capable) I am less capable than person 1
Others ﬁnd me less capable than person 1
I\person A\person 1 (less skilled socially) I am less skilled socially than person 1
Others ﬁnd me less skilled socially than person 1
Person A[person 1[me (more spontaneous) Person A is more spontaneous than me
Others ﬁnd person A more spontaneous than me
I[person A[person 1 (ridiculed) I feel ridiculed more quickly than person 1
Others ridicule me more quickly than person 1
I[person A[person 1 (rejected) I feel rejected more quickly than person 1
Others reject me more quickly than person 1
Person A[person 1[me (more interesting) Person A is more interesting than me
Others ﬁnd person A more interesting than me
Person A[person 1[me (taken seriously) Person A feels taken seriously more often than me
Others take person A seriously more often than me
I[person 1[person A (looked at) I feel looked at more quickly than person A
Others look at me more quickly than at person A
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Leopard[human being[snail (faster) A leopard is faster than a snail
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White\grey\black (lighter) White is lighter than black
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